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Approved For Release 2000/08/31 : CIA-RDP78S02149R000100220003-3

8 May 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: Meeting with DIA Personnel on Coordination of Appendix
to McNamara IV Project.

25X1A9a

1. On Thursday, 4 May 1967, [REDACTED] Chief, T/SP arranged a meeting of CIA and DIA personnel to discuss differences in bomb damage assessment on bridges and transport equipment in North Vietnam, as recorded in McNamara IV. The meeting was scheduled for 0900 hours, Friday, 5 May 1967 at DIA, Arlington Hall Station.

2. The following personnel were present:

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CIA
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
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3. After [REDACTED], and [REDACTED] discussed their differences in the bridge damage count, [REDACTED] met with [REDACTED] to discuss differences in the transport sections, specifically the number of different types of transport equipment destroyed or damaged. DIA estimates were higher than CIA's due to different methodologies. That is, in the case of trucks, DIA analysts assign numbers to the words "several", "numerous", or "many" appearing in pilot reports or transport equipment. In the watercraft category, DIA claimed to have files of pilot reports from the beginning of the Rolling Thunder program. Duplication was eliminated by plotting sightings by coordinates and time. This method was used instead of the Bomb Damage Assessment sheets, which CIA used, which supposedly contains an element of double-counting. While the DIA

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method is most likely more thorough than the Bomb Damage Assessment sheets, which rely on temporary workers, it does not explain DIA's higher estimates. An agreement on the table concerning transport equipment (Section C. Number 1) could not be reached. A footnote to the CIA figures was suggested, which reads: "DIA estimates of equipment losses are significantly higher for trucks and water-craft due to differences in acceptance criteria".

FOIA b3 c DIA. 4. Table B9 under Section C, number 2 was also challenged by [REDACTED] suggested a table of their own on transport facilities. However, the estimates of CIA and DIA were again at odds due to different methods of analysis and categories. The value of the CIA table was questioned, since it is based on Bomb Damage Assessment sheets. CIA agreed it was not authoritative, but did not accept DIA's figures since it did not accept DIA's methods. It was suggested that the table be deleted, but that the cost estimates be retained.

5. The meeting was amicable and tentative agreement was reached on all issues.

[REDACTED] 25X1A9a

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